WESTERN EUROPE A NUCLEAR HOSTAGE OF THE USA?

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ATOMIC DIPLOMACY

The United States was the only one among the most advanced capitalist countries which strengthened its political and economic position on a global scale as a consequence of the Second World War. Its territory was not affected by armed operations, and the wartime production boom increased its share in the world capitalist economy. The monopoly of nuclear weapons which the United States gained at the close of the war underlined its military strength. Its foreign-policy objectives were determined primarily by efforts to enhance its great-power position. In his message to Congress on January 14, 1946, President Harry Truman declared that the United States could not avoid the responsibility ensuing from its position as the strongest power in the world, and that all efforts must be centred on a single task—to gain the strongest influence on international developments.

The United States rapidly left no one in doubt that it would exert great efforts to subordinate all countries of the capitalist world to American imperialism. This was evident not only in its attempts to seize positions of power in the economic and political life of the defeated fascist countries, and in the penetration of the traditional foreign markets of these countries, but also in attempts to capture the pre-war markets and political influence of its wartime allies. At the same time the United States made great efforts to halt the revolutionary process in the world, using for this purpose the Cold War against the Soviet Union, the newly-emerging people's democratic countries, and all revolutionary and democratic forces in the world.

In 1947, the White House adopted its first post-war strategic concept—the containment doctrine. Its authors claimed that the purpose of the doctrine was to curb the "aggressive" and "expansionist" tendencies it alleged were inherent in the foreign policies of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. According to the views of one of its authors, George F Kennan, expressed in the journal

Foreign Affairs in July 1947, the policy of containment was intended to confront the Russians with unflinching force wherever they attempted to endanger the interests of the "peace-loving and consolidated world".

The authors of the containment doctrine proceeded from the assumption that long-term peaceful co-existence of states with different social systems was impossible, but believed that it would best suit the interests of the United States if it were possible to destroy the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries without having to resort to "total war" (even then a number of more realistic American politicians doubted whether the United States would win such a war). They stressed the need to rely on the Soviet Union's "evolutionary development". The foreign policy of the United States was to rest not only on the active use of "internal difficulties" of the socialist countries but also on aggravating these difficulties if possible. The doctrine was based on the assumption that socialism was growing stronger only by its extension to other countries and that prevention of this would result in the disintegration of the socialist states. In the military-political sphere, the Truman doctrine became the expression of this policy of containment, and at the same time a graphic example of the plans of American imperialism to dominate the world. The initial opportunity for the adoption of the doctrine was the issue of US help to Greece and to the British army occupying Greece at the time of the outbreak of the national liberation struggle of the Greek people against monarchist and fascist forces (the post-war Greek Civil War). But the main purpose of the Truman doctrine was to halt by force the objective historical process taking place in various parts of the world.

Relying on the Truman doctrine the United States attempted, under the pretext of ensuring its own security, to gain important military-strategic positions in regions a long way from American shores but close to the borders of the Soviet Union. One consequence of the doctrine was the creation of a dense network of US military bases in the eastern Mediterranean.

Outwardly the containment doctrine was cloaked in defensive terminology but its real aim was entirely different: to maintain and expand the global influence of the United States. This is also evident given the fact that the doctrine envisaged active US interference in the internal affairs of the socialist countries and its allies in western Europe and

elsewhere in the world.

The use of the atomic bomb at the end of the Second World War showed mankind what progress science and technology had made in the military sphere. The bombs dropped on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki shocked people all over the world and revealed the horrible prospect of nuclear war.

The United States however saw the atomic bomb as a means of dealing with the Soviet Union from a position of strength. That is why it continued its nuclear build-up after the war and thus forced the Soviet Union to expand its own nuclear research in the military sphere.

The external political propaganda of the United States was doing everything to convince world public opinion that the US government, allegedly guided by humane and peace-loving motives, had never regarded its policy as an American monopoly of nuclear weapons. In one of his public speeches, carried on October 25, 1945, by the *New York Times*, President Harry Truman declared that the atomic bomb had not changed the principles of the foreign policy of the United States. According to James Francis Byrnes in the book, "Speaking Frankly" (New York, 1947), the United States was never guilty of "atomic diplomacy" and should never be accused of it in the future. But of course facts speak differently, as do several admissions by Truman and Byrnes, amongst others, in the President's memoirs: "Memoirs by Harry S Truman". In them Truman revealed that by April 1945 Secretary of State Byrnes had told him that the atomic bomb would apparently give the United States such a strong military position that it could dictate terms to the world at the end of the war. Truman admitted in his memoirs that he and his Administration regarded the possession of the atomic bombs as one of the decisive factors for the post-war foreign policy of the United States.

Being at that time the only power possessing atomic weapons, the United States used its monopoly on numerous occasions as a tool for blackmail and pressure in its relations with the rest of the world—primarily with the Soviet Union. Washington assumed that, thanks to its advanced scientific, technological and economic base, it would be able not only to maintain its nuclear superiority but even to increase it.

General M D Taylor, later Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the US Armed Forces, wrote that the destructive power of the atomic bomb was the basis of the belief that the US Air Force had been given a weapon of decisive

importance which would enable the United States to gain control over the world and impose a *"pax Americana"*. What this *"pax Americana"* was to be really like is clear to see in a number of US plans for war against the Soviet Union and its allies, such as those drawn up in the 1940s: Charioteer, Cogwheel, Gunpowder, Fleetwood, and Dropshot.

On September 18, 1945, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff approved directive No. 1496/2 on the basic principles of military policy, and on October 9, 1945, directive No. 1518 on the strategic concept and plan for using the US armed forces. The two directives already contained the principle of a nuclear first strike against the Soviet Union. The US Joint Intelligence Committee in its document No. 329 of November 3, 1945—three months after the atomic bombing of Hiroshima—listed twenty Soviet cities, beginning with Moscow, which were to be the targets of atomic bombs. According to the Charioteer plan of mid-1948, 133 atomic bombs were to be dropped on 70 Soviet cities.

In September 1949 the completion of an atomic bomb by the Soviet Union was announced. This, in the face of the atomic danger posed by the United States, strengthened the defence capability of the socialist countries and put an end to US atomic blackmail. Realistic people in the West immediately called for a treaty banning the use of atomic weapons to be concluded by the two powers. The Soviet Union in fact had already proposed in 1946 that an agreement banning production and use of atomic weapons be concluded.

The 1950 directive of the US Government, NSC-68, in defiance of all realistic voices, provided for an escalated arms build-up and for the stockpiling of nuclear weapons. It said that, as the United States does not and never will wish to give up its goals, it cannot declare that it would not use nuclear weapons. Just as before, the United States maintained its option of waging an atomic war against the Soviet Union.

The Dropshot plan for example outlined the envisaged course of such a war to be fought at the end of the 1940s. Its main features were expounded on August 12, 1949, in the Armed Froces Committee of the US Congress by General H R Vandenburg, Chief of Staff of the US Air Force. The plan envisaged:

a) in the first phase, destruction of up to 85 per cent of the industrial potential of the USSR by the dropping of

300 atomic bombs and 250,000 tonnes of conventional bombs,

b) in the second phase, continued air raids on the USSR were to give the United States control over the seas and oceans,

c) in the third phase, 144 divisions of ground forces (of which more than half were to be divisions of the West European allies of the United States) and a major part of their air forces were to defeat the armed forces of the USSR and other socialist countries and force them to surrender,

d) in the fourth and final phase, an occupation regime was to be established on the territories of the occupied socialist countries. US and West European units were to be the forces of occupation.

The Dropshot plan was adopted on December 19, 1949. In subsequent years it greatly influenced US preparations for launching a nuclear war against the USSR and other socialist countries. The United States was escalating its arms build-up and stockpiling of nuclear weapons. According to the above directive, NSC-68, the US military budget was to be increased to at least 50,000 million dollars, i.e. four times more than the military expenditure at that time. However, the Truman Administration was unable to justify its requests by any arguments, except its propaganda allegations of the existence of a "Soviet military threat".

Already by the close of the 1940s and into the early 1950s the myth of a military danger from the East had become the US' main means of deceiving nations. Almost every day reports were being published on the growth of Soviet military strength and, on the West European book market, publications began to appear which contained "informed" scenarios of a third world war, describing in frightening detail the advance of Soviet armour into the heartland of Western Europe. All this was intended to win public support for the steadily rising arms spending. The arguments, based on an alleged Soviet military threat, were intended to shape public opinion in Western Europe and arouse fear of the Soviet Union among the people. In this way, the United States wished to paralyse from the outset the opposition of the West European public to the involvement of West European countries in its war plans.

PARTNERSHIP OR DICTATE?

After the Second World War the United States devoted considerable attention to Western Europe for a number of reasons. Primarily, Western Europe represented for the United States an indispensable political and economic base for the implementation of its global policy.

A major factor in the political and military-strategic considerations of Washington was that West European countries bordered on the newly-established people's democracies in eastern Europe. It was therefore logical that Washington was greatly interested in a direct political and military alliance with countries which it intended to use in the event of its attack on the Soviet Union and its allies such as was conceived in the Dropshot plan. The importance of Western Europe for US policy was also clearly evident in the fact that such major foreign-policy steps of the United States as the Truman doctrine, the Marshall Plan for economic aid, and the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) were primarily linked with Europe. Of the total US foreign aid of 47,000 million dollars spent from the end of the war until 1953, three-quarters went to Western Europe. US propaganda claimed, of course, that the US Administration extended the aid to these countries for purely humanitarian reasons, to enable them to overcome more easily the economic difficulties caused by the war.

In actual fact, it was already the continuation of the "dollar diplomacy" well known from between the wars– the use of economic pressure, blackmail and bribery for political ends.

The policy of the United States towards Western Europe in the post-war years was best characterised by the Marshall Plan, adopted in 1947. Its implementation showed that US economic aid was closely tied not only to economic but also political and military demands of the United States, the fulfilment of which was basically at variance with the interests of the peoples of West European countries. US

credit was a bribe intended to make European states surrender their economic and later also their political independence.

The real aims of the Marshall Plan were revealed in a number of statements by US officials. In his message to Congress on March 17, 1948, President Truman spoke of the direct connection between the programme for European recovery and the military policy of the United States. According to the *New York Times,* January 21, 1948, the then Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal, declared at a session of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the spending on the programme of aid to European countries was in fact spending on the "national defence of the United States".

The Marshall Plan also played a major role in the creation of suitable conditions for the foundation of NATO and for the phased transformation of Western Europe into a staging area for possible aggression against the socialist countries. It had already become evident in the years immediately after the war that the attainment of US global plans required the participation of all other capitalist countries throughout the world. In other words it was necessary to create a military-political bloc of capitalist countries around the United States.

It is therefore logical that it was primarily the leading European capitalist countries that were encouraged by the US to become the main members of the NATO pact. Officially it was to be an alliance of the United States and the countries of the western hemisphere in the interests of ensuring mutual security. But, in fact, this security was not being threatened by any state and the US strategists regarded the whole world to be a region of "American security" and the highest US officials openly spoke of the anti-Soviet thrust of the planned military agreements. It is necessary not only to doubt the credibility of these assertions about the defensive character of NATO but to reach the conclusion that the purposes of the pact have never been defensive. If they were, why does NATO adopt negative positions to the proposals of the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Treaty countries which are aimed at ensuring European peace and security? It is well known what the reactions of the United States and its allies were to the declared readiness of the socialist countries to join NATO and subsequently to conclude a non-aggression pact between NATO and the later-established Warsaw Treaty Organisation.

An important role in US plans was played by the Federal Republic of German (West Germany) and this was later underscored by its joining NATO. Regardless of its defeat in the war, there was considerable industrial potential available in the Western-occupied zones of Germany. Washington also attached great importance to its geographical location in the centre of Europe, and to the fact that it was occupied by Western armies which aided US economic penetration of the West German economy. Since the first post-war days, when smoke still hung over the ruins of many European cities, the United States has been making political, economic and military preparations for a possible new armed adventure—atomic war against the Soviet Union and its allies, in which Western Europe is to play an important role.

A closer look at the various plans for attack on the Soviet Union adopted by the US in the second half of the 1940s shows that the main stress was placed on the air force. Already by 1947 Congress had approved the plan for a substantial strengthening of the US Air Force and, in accordance with the political plans of the White House, the plan for the creation of a chain of US air bases around the Soviet Union and the territories of its allies. The White House had a number of reasons for the creation of a world-wide network of US military bases. Besides purely political reasons, the capabilities of American warplanes were taken into consideration; at that time, planes from bases in the USA were unable to attack targets in the Soviet Union. In 1951, US Navy Chief of Staff, Admiral Sherman, stressed that one of the main tasks of the armed forces of the United States was to ensure that operations in a possible war took place as far as possible from the territory of the United States. According to US strategists, best suited for this task were US military bases around the world, and especially in Europe which would, in the event of war, become the main targets of Soviet retaliatory strikes, while US territory would be spared any destruction. To put it simply, the United States hoped that in the new conditions, it would be able to implement its plans of global domination without having to fear—in view of the enormous distances between the USA and Europe—that military operations would extend to the American continent. Washington calculated that it would be able to maintain the same invulnerability of the United States as it had enjoyed during the Second World War.

A pretext for strengthening the American military presence in Western Europe was the "Berlin airlift" at the end of the 1940s. The United States used this crisis, which it had itself created, as an excuse for stationing B-29 strategic bombers in Britain; they carried out regular "patrol" flights, with atomic bombs aboard, over the Mediterranean and in the north of Europe. This was at a time when the Soviet Union did not yet possess nuclear weapons. Ninety planes of this type were transferred to Europe as the first forward-based American weapons system in Western Europe.

The implementation of the post-war foreign policy programme was accompanied by increased US activity in military-strategic, political, economic and ideological spheres. In each of them the United States used a number of methods and means for attaining its aims—from conventional arms build-up to nuclear blackmail, from bilateral military agreements to multilateral pacts, from espionage and subversion to the organising of anti-state conspiracies and armed interventions. At times the forms and methods of American expansionism changed according to the internal processes that were taking place inside the United States, or according to changes in the international situation. But the main objectives, character and essence of the foreign policy of US imperialism remained the same: attempts to destroy socialism, efforts aimed at preserving and strengthening the capitalist social system, at establishing American domination of the world.

THE SHIELD AND SWORD STRATEGY

After the Soviet Union tested its first nuclear weapons in 1949, the United States realised that its atomic monopoly was a thing of the past.

However, this did not compel the US Government to abandon its orientation on a possible global nuclear war. On the contrary, it sought solutions by further intensification of its arms build-up.

When the Republican Party came to power, Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles formulated a doctrine for the "liberation of Eastern Europe" and the "roll back of Communism", which came to be known later as the Dulles doctrine. Its principle was not to wait for gradual changes in the socialist countries but to start using more overt and immediate methods against the Soviet Union and its allies thus making it possible to "liberate" the nations which, it was alleged, the Soviet Union had forcibly incorporated into the socialist system after World War II. In the military sphere the expression of the Dulles doctrine was the concept of massive retaliation, envisaging the first use of nuclear weapons on a massive scale.

Also associated with the Dulles doctrine was the policy of brinkmanship—balancing on the very brink of war. This, according to US strategists, was to aggravate any conflicts in such a way as to make the Soviet Union reach the conclusion that it could only prevent the outbreak of nuclear war by capitulation.

John Foster Dulles claimed that success of his doctrine depended on the maximum escalation of US preparations for war, enabling the United States to be ready at any time to carry out armed operations against "Soviet aggression", for the interests of "democracy" and the "free world". Of course, the Soviet Union was not planning to start another world-wide conflagration. The real aim of the US arms build-up was to gain military superiority over the Soviet Union, which would them make it possible to change the policy of brinkmanship into armed aggression at any time it wished.

One of the ways which could, in Washington's view, guarantee victory for the United States in the event of a global nuclear war was a still closer coupling of US policy, including its military policy, with that of Western Europe. The Administration of President Dwight D Eisenhower exerted enormous efforts to persuade its NATO allies to take part in the arms build-up and preparations for a global nuclear war. The intensity of these efforts grew as it became increasingly apparent that without its allies, the United States was incapable of waging war against the socialist countries. Directive NSC 162/2, for example, stressed that without the help of its allies, the United States would not be able to meet the needs of its defence, even with massive military expenditure.

The role of Western Europe in the planned war was already calculated in the European variant of the strategy of "massive retaliation"—the shield and sword strategy. The shield was to be the European NATO forces equipped with conventional weapons, whose role would be to halt the projected attack of the socialist countries until the sword could be effectively used—the US Strategic Air Force equipped with nuclear weapons. The strategy assumed that the US' West European allies, or rather their NATO armies, would act as the shield of the United States and would bear the main brunt of the ground operations. In other words, in such a war Europe would again be the main theatre of operations. The United States reserved to itself the right to make decisions on the use of its strategic nuclear weapons—the sword—at a moment most suitable for it, regardless of the interests of its West European allies. The shield and sword strategy placed West European countries in a position of dependence on the United States.

Under the pretext of better defence, the Pentagon began to deploy new kinds of nuclear weapons in Western Europe. The first was the B-61 B Matador guided missile, with a range of 960 km, which was deployed in West Germany in 1954. This marked the beginning of an entirely new role for Western Europe in the military plans of the United States—it began to change from a conventional role to an atomic shield of the US.

It is clear what the US' motive was for deploying its nuclear weapons in Western Europe and for the transfer later of some types of nuclear carriers to its NATO allies. The United States assumed that in any armed conflict with the Soviet Union US nuclear weapons would inevitably

become strategically important targets for Soviet retaliatory strikes. It saw that any conflict between the USA and the USSR, including an all-out nuclear war, would take place on the soil of Western Europe. This assigned to Western Europe an unenviable role—it has become a nuclear hostage of the United States.

In May 1957, the NATO Council adopted a decision on equipping NATO armies with nuclear weapons. On February 22, 1958, the United States and Britain concluded a bilateral agreement providing for the building of four US missile bases on British soil, with 60 launching ramps for Thor ballistic medium-range guided missiles. They were capable of delivering a 1.5 megaton nuclear warhead a distance of 2,800 km.

On March 29, 1959, the US Government signed a similar agreement with Italy, and on October 30, with Turkey. On the basis of these agreements, Jupiter medium-range nuclear missiles were deployed in Italy and Turkey; they were capable of hitting targets at distances of up to 2,800 km. Their nuclear warheads had an explosive power equal to one megaton of TNT. The Pentagon installed 30 launching ramps in Italy and 15 in East Anatolia in Turkey, in close proximity to the Soviet border. Altogether 105 medium-range ballistic missiles were targetted on the Soviet Union and other socialist countries at the end of the 1950s. Moreover, the territory of the USSR was also in the range of US strategic bombers stationed in West European bases.

In the 1950s Britain and France began to develop and gradually deploy their own nuclear weapons. Even though the reasons for this step differed in several respects in the two countries—ensuing from the different levels of their bilateral relations with the United States—two reasons were identical. Neither France not Britain wanted to depend for their security entirely on the United States, nor did they wish to have secondary positions in NATO.

Britain started with the building of strategic bombers, and the first squadron of Valiant bombers was operational in 1957. The Vulcans, carrying nuclear bombs, were ready for action in the same year and the third type of bomber plane, the Victors, became available only a year later. France had its first strategic bomber, the Mirage IV, ready by 1964.

From the second half of the 1950s the massive retaliation concept was being subjected to ever-greater criticism in the United States. It was realised that, as a strategy, it was no

longer suitable for the military-strategic situation in the world. The territory of the United States was now no longer invulnerable to nuclear weapons. The strategic position of the United States changed fundamentally when the Soviet Union added strategic intercontinental guided missiles to its arsenal in response to those deployed earlier by the US.

In his book "Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy" (New York, 1975), Henry Kissinger wrote that the US' massive nuclear strike capability had not prevented the set-back in Korea, nor the loss of the northern part of Indo-china nor the Suez crisis. According to Kissinger, retention of the massive retaliation strategy would paralyse US foreign policy and deprive it of its flexibility. He pointed out the destructiveness of nuclear weapons and underlined that a global nuclear war would involve enormous risks for the United States itself. As regards Western Europe, Kissinger admitted that the US' military strategy of massive retaliation, the concept of a global nuclear war, aroused strong fears in allied European countries.

Of course, Kissinger was no peacemaker. He stressed that the effectiveness of the US policy for force and of US diplomacy could be enhanced by the adoption of a concept of a limited war, including the possibility of a limited nuclear war in Europe.

In the face of universal criticism the Pentagon began in the early 1960s, during the Kennedy Administration, to implement a "flexible response" doctrine, advocated since the mid-1950s by General M D Taylor. This doctrine rested on the principle of scaled deterrent. The armed forces of the United States and its allies were to be built up to such a degree as to deter the Soviet Union from attacking. In contrast to the massive retaliation concept, this deterrance was to be based on a wide range of military means. Also envisaged were limited conflicts and local wars, in which both conventional and nuclear weapons would be used.

The flexible response doctrine, which was adopted at the NATO session in December 1962, brought about an overall change of the shield and sword strategy. The sword was to be reinforced conventional NATO armies which were to defeat the Warsaw Treaty armies under the protection of a shield of nuclear weapons which would deter the Soviet Union from using nuclear weapons of its own.

BALANCE OF FORCES AND THE POLICY OF DETENTE

The deployment of US medium-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe and the introduction of strategic air forces into the British and French armed forces created an entirely new military-strategic situation in Europe at the end of the 1950s and into the 1960s. The United States and its NATO allies thus had better conditions for fighting a nuclear war, especially a limited nuclear war in Europe, at a time when the United States did not have to fear a massive retaliatory nuclear strike from the Soviet Union in view of the fact that the Soviet strategic nuclear weapons were still not at a sufficiently high level. A very tense situation thus developed in the world.

In the interests of its security and the security of its allies, the Soviet Union had to counter this danger resolutely by developing and speedily equipping its armed forces with similar medium-range missiles, the SS4 and SS5. The security of the socialist community also required that the Soviet Union develop and build medium-range bombers. In 1960 the Soviet Air Force received the first TU 16 planes, and the TU 22s a little later.

A dangerous situation in which mankind came close to the brink of nuclear war was the so-called Cuban missile crisis. Against openly hostile moves by the US against socialist Cuba, the Soviet Union responded by deploying medium-range missiles with nuclear warheads in Cuba. The naval blockade of Cuba by the United States then worsened the international situation. A peace settlement was only reached after an exchange of views between the US President and the Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers. The United States pledged not to carry out aggression against Cuba and the Soviet Union dismantled its missiles deployed there. On the basis of these Soviet-US negotiations, the United States withdrew its missiles from Turkey.

For technical reasons, the United States also pulled out

its Thor and Jupiter missiles from the other European countries in 1965. The two types were already largely obsolete because they used liquid fuels which made launching preparations very difficult and long. But primarily, the United States was already planning to replace its first-generation medium-range missiles with more advanced systems whose tactical and technical qualities were much more suitable for its flexible reponse doctrine. In 1964, Pershing 1 ballistic guided missiles, with a range of 740 km, were deployed in West Germany, and five American nuclear-powered submarines carrying Polaris and Poseidon ballistic guided missiles began to operate in European inshore waters. Constantly in the air above Western Europe were B 52 strategic bombers with nuclear bombs on board.

France and Britain also added atomic-powered submarines equipped with nuclear ballistic guided missiles to their navies. In subsequent years this nuclear arsenal was enlarged by US F-111 strategic bombers, which are still stationed at bases in Britain, and A6 and A7 planes, capable of carrying nuclear weapons were stationed with the US Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. Understandably, the Soviet Union could not ignore these attempts by the US to gain military superiority and was forced to continue building up its own strategic forces. At the end of the 1960s a military-strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union was achieved. The ending of the US strategic nuclear superiority had a positive effect on the process of lessening international tension.

Washington realised that its room to operate was now limited, even in local wars against small states such as its long war against Vietnam clearly demonstrated.

Where was then a guarantee of victory in a war against the Soviet Union—a power whose nuclear potential was comparable to that of the United States? This became one of the key questions in military-strategic circles of the US leadership at the end of the 1960s and into the early 1970s. No answer to the question was found in the Pentagon. Such guarantees did not exist. This conclusion, obviously, necessitated a fundamental change in the policy of the United States, including a reassessment of the role of military strength. Even though the then leadership of the US did not abandon the option of the use of force, it realised that it was not possible to steer the same foreign policy course. Washington became aware that in order to

solve the complex questions of international relations a dialogue with the Soviet Union was necessary, and in a broader context an East-West dialogue. The United States recognised that if peace were to be preserved, Soviet-American relations had to develop positively. In his book "The Memoirs of Richard Nixon" (New York, 1978, p.344), the former US President wrote that a much more sensible and safer way was to maintain contacts with Communist states rather than to live in the icy shell of isolation and confrontation of the Cold War period. Nixon stressed that the Soviet Union was probably the most crucial factor on which the preservation of peace depended not only during his Administration but also later.

The process of detente soon produced concrete results which also greatly concerned European nations. Treaties were signed between West Germany and four socialist states —the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic (East Germany), Czechoslovakia and Poland. On September 31, 1971, the four-power treaty on West Berlin was signed between the USA, USSR, Britain and France. It was a compromise between the interests of the four powers but on the whole it was an important document contributing to detente and to the further improvement of Soviet-American relations. In the first two years of the decade the Soviet Union and the United States signed more important agreements than in the entire previous history of their relations. Also, in the following years, a number of important agreements and treaties were signed, including:

—the principles of bilateral relations between the Soviet Union and the United States,

—the Soviet-US treaty on the limitation of anti-missile defence systems,

—the temporary agreement between the USSR and the USA on certain measures in the sphere of strategic offensive forces,

—the Soviet-US agreement on measures to reduce the danger of the outbreak of nuclear war.

(The last three were agreements concluded within the framework of the SALT 1 negotiations.)

—the Soviet-US treaty on the limitation of underground tests of nuclear weapons.

A characteristic feature of all these treaties and agreements was that they constituted the first step on the road towards eliminating the danger of a global nuclear war, and that they included provisions restricting the material base

of nuclear arms development. Especially significant in this respect were the treaties concluded during the SALT 1 talks within the framework of which it was possible for the first time, although not completely, to agree on the limitation of offensive strategic weapons. This positive trend in international developments was strengthened when Leonid Brezhnev met with US President Gerald Ford in Vladivostok in November 1974. The joint communique said that special attention was given to the key orientation of Soviet-American relations and to measures designed to eliminate the danger of war and to halt the arms race.

The importance of the meeting in Vladivostock was that it gave a new impetus to the SALT process. The most senior respresentatives of the USSR and the USA reached agreement on the principles of a new long-term treaty for the period from October 1977, when the temporary agreement was to expire, to December 31, 1985. It was agreed that each side would possess the same aggregate number of strategic weapons carriers (maximum 2,400) of which there would not be more than 1,320 land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles or ballistic missiles on nuclear-powered submarines equipped with multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehivles (MIRV). The two countries felt that the work on the treaty might be completed by 1975 and that in 1980-81, it would be possible to start negotiations on strategic arms limitations after 1985.

The talks on the SALT 2 treaty were not easy, but not because of any unacceptably hard stance by the Soviet Union, as some people in the United States have claimed. Full responsibility for the unhelpful course of the negotiations must rest with the United States. The cause was its incorrect interpretation of the Vladivostok accords. The United States refused to include in the limit of 2,400 strategic weapons carriers thousands of cruise missiles which, if deployed, would alter the strategic balance in favour of the US. It is understandable that the Soviet Union rejected this American attempt to upset the strategic balance.

Washington for its part insisted that the Soviet medium-range Backfire bomber be included in the ceiling of 2,400 strategic vehicles. The Soviet side could not agree to this because the tactical and technical capabilities of the plane did not enable it to hit targets in the United States. Moreover, the United States refused to include in the negotiations its forward-based nuclear weapons which, in contrast to the

Backfire bomber, are capable of hitting targets in the Soviet Union from Western Europe. The SALT 2 talks again showed not only the complexity of the whole problem of nuclear weapons but also the very close connection between strategic nuclear weapons and medium-range weapon systems.

The signing of the SALT 2 treaty in Vienna on June 18, 1979, was for a long time the last positive step towards detente. However, it was not ratified by the US Congress. A period of worsening relations between the Soviet Union and the United States began at the end of the 1970s and into the 1980s.

BACK TO CONFRONTATION

The complications in the SALT negotiations in the second half of the 1970s were not only the consequence of the subjective views of President Carter and his Administration as to ways of pursuing US interests in its relations with the Soviet Union, but it had much deeper causes. US officials believed that if international detente reached such an extent it would no longer correspond to their ideas. Therefore, they described the process of detente as a one-way road benefitting only Moscow. At the same time they called on the Soviet Union to agree to an American code of conduct if the United States were to continue to pursue a policy of easing international tension. It was believed that the United States had to be strong, continue to build up its military potential and threaten to use it, in order to force the Soviet Union to meet US demands. In this way in the second half of the 1970s the United States began to prepare the ground for the return to the position of strength policy and this completely prevailed in US diplomacy towards the end of the 1970s and into the 80s.

The real reasons why US policy shifted from detente to confrontation were, of course, entirely different. A deeper view of the situation in the world in that period shows clearly that the change in US policy was caused not by events in Afghanistan or Poland, nor by the replacement of the obsolete Soviet SS 4 and SS 5 missiles by the medium-range SS 20 guided missiles, as Western propaganda often claims.

The real reason was that US ruling circles feared further changes in the balance of forces worldwide in the favour of socialism. The socialist states had strengthened their international position and the disintegration of the old colonial systems of capitalism was complete. In the developing countries US influence had weakened. The United States blamed these changes on the policy of detente with the Soviet Union. In this connection it also began to point out what it called negative consequences of

the strategic balance between the USSR and the USA.

This turn of American policy from detente to confrontation was also to a large degree due to the distinct changes that took place during the 1970s in the US' relations with West European states. European countries were now becoming major competitors of the United States for world markets and exerted ever greater efforts and displayed greater ability to protect their economic interests against the United States. Instead of a position of dependence and subservience, Western Europe sought equal partnership with the United States, however this was never allowed to happen by the US despite frequent solemn declarations to the contrary.

A number of serious differences also arose between the United States and Western Europe within NATO. For example, the United States very resolutely demanded that the West European NATO countries increase their military budgets by at least three per cent per annum in real terms —this is one of the causes of the economic and social problems of the smaller NATO countries—and that they also increase their contributions to the joint armament programmes of the alliance. It is therefore understandable that the West European NATO countries subsequently demanded a greater say in the various bodies of the organisation. Washington was also concerned about some aspects of West European integration and the activities of the European Group of NATO in its efforts, for example, to build a West European arms industry which would produce almost all major conventional weapons systems for their own armed forces. This would lead to lower European arms purchases in the United States and thus a decline in the massive profits of the US arms industry which, through its military-industrial complex of senior executives and military personnel, largely determines US policy. Washington also feared further differences in the respective view of the objectives of the NATO alliance. Whereas the United States has always regarded NATO as an instrument for aiding its control of the international political situation in the West European member countries and as the main striking force against the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries within its overall global strategy, the European Group on the other hand places special stress on regional aspects. This does not apply to the same degree to all the European member countries, in this connection Britain's military activity in the South Atlantic and the Indian Ocean should be noted.

The US Administration realised that its political and economic influence in Western Europe was weakening. It saw one of the ways of reversing the situation in the creation of conditions for greater military dependence of Western Europe on the United States. It decided to strengthen these ties mainly with the larger West European NATO countries and to make them its nuclear hostages by, amongst other actions, deploying new medium-range missiles on their soil.

A much deeper analysis would be necessary to understand the causes which led to a shift towards confrontation in Washington's foreign policy. Not a small role was played by its efforts to ensure supplies of strategic raw materials, especially oil. The view prevailed in the US Administration that it was imperative to prevent the growth of revolutionary tendencies in those developing countries which were rich in strategic raw materials. The change of US policy was also caused by including the military-industrial complex in the whole political decision-making process and from this the activation of conservative forces in the United States, along with several other factors. The United States began to pursue a policy of confrontation in all areas of international relations, but, in keeping with the special stress placed by Washington on the use of strength in international relations, the main efforts were made in the military sphere.

MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES – THE TRUTH AND THE MYTHS

Even before his inauguration, US President Jimmy Carter announced his intention to reassess the military policy of the 1970s and to formulate a new strategy. Carter's concrete instructions for the reassessment of the military policy and strategy of the United States were given in directive No. 18 of 1977. The study of the state and prospects of the military-strategic position of the United States in the world, known as the Presidential Review Memorandum (PRM 10), confirmed the existence of a balance between the Soviet Union and the United States in the strategic sphere. This conclusion had a fundamental effect on the agreement of the Carter Administration to continue with the Soviet-US talks on the limitation of strategic offensive weapons (SALT 2). But, at the same time, the conclusions also led the Pentagon and the military advisers around the President to call for speedy changes to be made in the nuclear strategy of the United States–in line with the overall change of the US foreign and military policy–and for military measures designed to regain for the US its dominant position in world affairs.

The result was that in the second half of the 1970s the strike power of the US armed forces was substantially increased, particularly of the units stationed in Western Europe and the divisions which were to be transferred to Europe in the event of war. At that time Washington also laid the foundations for an intervention force which was to protect American "interests" in the developing countries, particularly in the Middle East and Persian Gulf.

Simultaneously the Pentagon was taking steps to change the balance of forces in its favour by means of several types of weapons of mass annihilation. This concerned above all the production of the neutron bomb and its deployment in Western Europe, and later binary chemical weapons, and the deployment of new US medium-range missiles. But in

this connection, Washington and its NATO allies faced the difficult task of how to explain the starting of a new round of arms build-up in Europe to the West European public. Just as in many other cases Western propaganda made use of its tried and tested tool for shaping public opinion in Western Europe–the bogeyman of a Soviet military threat. The deployment of the neutron bomb in Western Europe was to be explained by the alleged threat posed by the tank armies of the Warsaw Treaty countries, while the US medium-range missiles, the Western media claimed and is still claiming to this day, were to be a counterweight to the Soviet SS 20 medium-range missiles. At first sight it might seem that these were simple calculations that might convince many people. It was on this apparent simplicity of the issue that the advocates of the deployment of new US missiles in Western Europe based their propaganda campaign amongst the public.

As already indicated and shown by all the talks on nuclear weapons, the question of nuclear armament and disarmament is very complicated, has historical connotations, and is an important part of the foreign and military policies of states–both those possessing nuclear weapons and those without. Also all questions of partial nuclear armament and disarmament must be considered in close connection with other kinds of nuclear weapons and, in a wider context with the problem of non-nuclear weapons–including the US' attempts to extend preparations for war into outer space. That is why when a closer look is taken at the issue, the main arguement of the West for the deployment of new US missiles in Western Europe is absolutely untenable.

Just as in the case of weapons systems, and especially with regard to medium-range missiles, it was the United States which took the initiative. This is evident not only in the history of these weapons but also in the developments concerning this issue in the 1970s and 80s. It must be borne in mind that deployment of the Soviet SS 20 missiles began in 1976 (only on Soviet territory, please note), almost twenty years after the deployment of the SS 4 and SS 5 guided missiles had been developed and sited in response to the creation of forward-based US nuclear systems deployed in Western Europe and targeted on the Soviet Union and its allies.

The US forward-based nuclear weapons are thus the real reason why Soviet medium-range missiles appeared on the scene. It is logical that over the almost twenty year period

which had elapsed since the deployment of the SS 4 and SS 5 missiles considerable progress had been made in science and technology, including the technology of missiles and guidance systems. In other words the SS 4 and SS 5 missiles had become obsolete both from the technical and military viewpoints and were therefore replaced by the SS 20 missiles. It should be pointed out in this connection that in the NATO countries most of the aircraft and missiles are replaced by new systems after 15 years or less; this is also true of medium-range missiles. Britain, for example, modernised its ballistic missiles mounted aboard its nuclear-powered submarines quite recently, and plans to replace the Polaris A 3 missiles with the entirely new US-made Trident 2 ballistic missiles, with a substantially greater range and accuracy and a higher number of warheads. A similar process is taking place with regard to the French nuclear arsenal and US weapons on forward-sited bases in Western Europe. It is logical that, in this situation, the Soviet Union had to modernise its medium-range weapons systems. Of course the SS 20 missiles are more advanced than those they replaced but their combat potential is essentially the same: their range is similar to that of the old SS 5 missiles, and the total explosive force of the warheads is even lower. It can be said that despite this Soviet modernisation the strategic balance has been maintained in medium-range missiles.

This conclusion was even expressed by several senior representatives in the United States. Former Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown, decared in 1977, that is a year after the Soviet Union began to deploy the SS 20 missiles, that from the viewpoint of the United States the balance of military forces had not changed to its disfavour. Similar statements were also made by a number of other political and military representatives of West European countries and the United States including US Secretary of State Alexander Haig. It can therefore be said that the overall balance of military forces, as it developed between East and West in the 1970s, could not have been the reason for the installation of almost 600 new US medium-range cruise missiles in Western Europe if the United States wanted, as it kept asserting, only to maintain equilibrium.

An important aspect in this connection is that whereas the Soviet SS 20 missiles represent only the modernisation of obsolete types of missiles, which is evident from the unchanged combat capabilities of the new missiles compared

to those they replaced, the new US medium-range weapons —cruise missiles and Pershing 2 ballistic missiles—are qualitatively new weapons systems with a first-strike capability. The Soviet guided missiles did not and could not lead to a change of the military strategy of the Soviet Union and to the upsetting of the military balance in Europe. Its role was and still is, even after modernisation, to counter the medium-range weapons in the arsenals of the NATO armies in Western Europe. On the contrary, the US medium-range Pershing 2 and cruise missiles are one of the main factors in the new military strategy of the United States which was conceived in the 1970s and which envisages the use of US medium-range weapons as part of a first pre-emptive nuclear strike against strategic targets in the Soviet Union. In contrast, the Soviet SS 20 missiles cannot hit any targets in the United States. This fact alone is so important from the viewpoint of the Soviet-US balance of forces that it cannot be avoided in any way during negotiations if the two sides are to have equal security. Viewed thus, the US nuclear medium-range missiles have created a qualitatively new strategic situation, not only in Europe but on the global scale. This is also the fundamental difference between equipment modernisation and rearmament, with regard to medium-range missiles.

The need to modernise the Soviet medium-range missiles stemmed also from the intensive development of comparable weapons systems in the United States. In the early 1970s the then Secretary of Defense, James Schlesinger, requested from Congress funds for the development of the Pershing 2 missile. According to the October 1980 issue of *The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists,* the US defence budgets for 1971 and 1972 included several million dollares for the development of the Pershing 2 missile. At the end of the 1960s and into the 1970s the Tomahawk cruise missile was also being intensively developed. It is therefore fully justified to ask what right does Washington and its NATO allies have to speak of a NATO response to the introduction of Soviet SS 20 missiles?

Western propaganda is trying to besmirch the peace policy of the Soviet Union and its allies in a variety of ways. These attempts include allegations that the Soviet Union is making preparations for the occupation of Western Europe, and that its medium-range missiles are first-strike weapons. The purpose of these propaganda campaigns is to frighten the West European public to weaken the influence

of the peace movement, and thus to create favourable conditions for the adoption of any further militarist measures. The Soviet Union stressed on numerous occasions that its military strategy does not envisage either a first- or a pre-emptive nuclear strike. It should be borne in mind that the Soviet Union solemnly pledged before the whole world in the United Nations that it would never be first to use nuclear weapons.

Western allegations of Soviet preparations for a nuclear first strike are also absurd when its military capability is examined. A nuclear first strike serves its purpose only when the aggressor suceeds in eliminating, or at least substantially weakening the strategic nuclear potential of the enemy which is to be used for a retaliatory nuclear strike. The Soviet medium-range missiles do not have this capability (whereas the US Pershing 2 missiles do). Nor does the Soviet strategic potential have this capability in view of the fact that in existing conditions, after any launching of Soviet intercontinental missiles, the United States would have ample time to launch its own inter-continental missiles before the warheads of the Soviet missiles could fall on US territory (this is the principle of mutually-assured destruction—MAD!). In such a situation a Soviet first strike against Western Europe would invite, as the United States itself asserts, a retaliatory attack by the US strategic nuclear potential based in the United States itself and unaffected by such an attack. That is why it is absolute nonsense to describe the SS 20 missiles as first-strike weapons—they are totally unsuited for such a role.

Equally absurd is another allegation of the Western media machine which is trying to present Soviet medium-range missiles as a means of political pressure on Western Europe and the United States. But even if such a ridiculous possibility if considered, that the Soviet Union, despite its principled peace policy, would resort to such a way of pursuing its foreign-policy goals, a requirement for the success of such a policy would be military superiority, but the Soviet Union does not have such a superiority nor does it seek it.

The problem of military balance between East and West, in Europe in particular, is another favourite subject of the Western press when it attempts to justify any aggressive steps of the West. This is also the case for medium-range missiles.

In the past few years, numerous comparisons have

appeared in Western publications and military journals of qualitative and quantitative aspects of the various weapons systems. The comparisons, however competently made, differed greatly in details and in conclusions. In some cases the inaccuracies could be ascribed to the authors' lack of objective information, in others they were deliberate. At variance with the facts, most of the comparisons claimed that the Warsaw Treaty countries have a superiority in medium-range missiles. The West German White Paper on Defence said in 1979, for example, that NATO had only 386 medium-range missiles but the Warsaw Treaty countries reportedly had 1,370 of them. The London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies listed 960 weapons systems on the NATO side and 1,039 in the Warsaw Treaty countries. Harvard University professor Paul Dotag said in his analysis that NATO had 2,148 and the Warsaw Treaty 2,135 medium-range nuclear missiles.

The main reason for these differences was that the authors relied on different data and included other weapons systems in their calculations while deliberately leaving out others. But in any case it was clear that these manipulations with figures which were published were intended to deceive the West European public in such an important issue as war and peace,

The retired Italian General Nino Pasti, former Deputy Commander of NATO forces in South Europe, said that the US intelligence service disseminates all these reports and information either directly or through the mass media, and that it is dangerous to regard the information as correct and presenting a true picture. He added that the governments of NATO states were guided by this information when it suited their domestic and foreign policies and were thus gambling with detente, security and peace.

The most senior Soviet representatives have expressed the Soviet position on the balance of forces in medium-range weapons on several occasions. They point out that in all its calculations the West is leaving out sea- and air-launched missiles, as well as the French and British nuclear forces. They say that, according to competent Soviet calculations, each side had in Europe about 1,000 medium-range weapons systems before the deployment of the new US missiles. The Soviet representatives underline that, in calculating the balance of forces in medium-range weapons, the Soviet side was taking three main factors into account—the number of nuclear warhead carriers, the number of

warheads and their total explosive force. According to these principles of calculation, the US and NATO medium-range missiles have the capacity to carry 50 per cent more nuclear warheads than similar Soviet weapons.

These facts make it clear that the NATO Council decision to deploy the new US medium-range missiles was not made because of any alleged upsetting of the East-West military balance. On the contrary, the Pentagon believed that by the deployment of the new medium-range missiles it would gain enormous qualitative and quantitative superiority not only in the East-West balance of forces in Europe but also on a global scale. One of President Reagan's close collaborators, Robert L Pfaltzgraff, said in an interview for the Italian paper *Manifesto,* November 18, 1980, that the "modernisation" of nuclear weapons for the European theatre by the United States was directly connected with the strengthening of the US' strategic forces. The same view was expressed by several West European politicians. Kurt Becker, the official spokesman of the West German government, declared at a press conference on February 27, 1981, that the new US medium-range missiles undoubtedly complemented intercontinental strategic weapons. He admitted that by the deployment of 572 new medium-range missiles, the United States would gain a strategic advantage.

The right-wing press made great efforts to convince the West European public that the new US missiles represented stronger nuclear guarantees of the United States towards Western Europe, and greater overall security for Western Europe. It must again be stressed that Western Europe is not being threatened in any way by the Soviet Union and the socialist countries.

In its entire history the Soviet Union has not broken its international obligations in a single instance, and there is no reason to fear that it will resort to such a step at any time in the future, this is a fundamental principle of the policy of the Soviet Union and its allies.

Does the Western argument mean that the previous US nuclear guarantees given to Western Europe were not reliable? Was it possible to doubt that the United States would be ready to sacrifice say New York or Washington in order to save Hamburg or Munich? The question logically arises as to whether the US nuclear guarantees have become more reliable after the deployment of cruise and Pershing 2 missiles. Of course not. In a situation where Europe is

crammed with nuclear weapons, and where the Soviet Union and the United States possess strategic nuclear arsenals with multiple overkill capability, any speculation about nuclear guarantees in connection with US medium-range missiles is absolutely absurd. This was confirmed by developments in the first half of the 1980s. Instead of stabilisation and the improvement of the international situation, it worsened as a consequence of the deployment of Pershing 2 and cruise missiles.

The new US medium-range missiles cannot strengthen the security of Western Europe in any way. On the contrary, they only increase the risk of nuclear war and the threat against not only the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Treaty allies but also to the vital interests and independence of the West European countries. They seriously impede the efforts to preserve peace. This conclusion is based not only on the assertions of the political and military representatives of the socialist countries but also on the views of realistic people in the West. The US disarmament expert Professor George W Rathjeus declared that such a weapon as the Pershing 2 missile greatly increases the danger of an incorrect assessment of the situation and misunderstanding on both sides. In a tense situation, it causes greater nervousness on both sides, uncertainty and readiness for a first strike.

The two new types of US medium-range missiles have caused greater uncertainty, chaos and destabilisation than all previous nuclear weapons. None of the previous weapons systems was so likely to inadvertently cause a world war as the two new missile systems.

Alfred Mechtersheimer, a former officer of the West German air force command working in the Max Planck Institute in Starnberg, commented on the new situation in Europe briefly but very succinctly when he said that the US missiles made a nuclear war in Europe much more likely than at any time before.

This has also been realised by many West European politicians, and above all by broad sections of the West European politicians, and above all by broad sections of the West European public. No wonder then that the West European NATO countries did not welcome the new US missile on their soil. They are only too well aware of the implacable law of every war that the warring countries try at first to destroy those weapons of the enemy which pose the greatest threat. At the present time this means nuclear

weapons. It follows from this therefore that, in the event of war, not only the civilian population living in the areas of US nuclear bases would be be exposed to a much greater danger but, in view of the dense network of these bases and nuclear ammunition depots, the entire population of Western Europe would face total destruction.

DIRECTIVE No. 59

The previous chapters dealt with the political causes which led in the second half of the 1970s to the turn of US foreign policy from detente to confrontation, also reflected in the decision to deploy US Pershing 2 and cruise missiles in Western Europe.

This chapter will explain the place and role of the Pershing 2 and cruise missiles in the military strategy of the United States.

Although in 1977 the Carter Administration basically limited itself to the formulation of the fundamental principles of its military policy, by 1978 it had already made a number of concrete decisions (along with its NATO allies), aimed at gaining military superiority over the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty countries. A long-term NATO armaments programme was adopted and the US Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missiles received new MK 12A multiple nuclear warheads which substantially enhanced the US' ability to carry out a nuclear first strike. The United States did not even bother to conceal this objective of its military policy. Former Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown, said, when presenting the draft military budget to the Senate Armed Forces Committee in December 1979, that the United States intended to remain the strongest country in the world and to direct political developments in the last two decades of the 20th century according to its ideas. This was at a time when the NATO Council made the so-called dual decision on the basis of which the deployment of the new US medium-range missiles was started in Western Europe in 1983.

In the first years of Jimmy Carter's administration, the principles of the US military strategy for the second half of the 1970s and for the 1980s were formulated. The main principles of the new American military strategy were contained in Presidential Directive No. 59 of 1980. Theoretically, the directive was based on the ideas of the

former US Secretary of Defense, James Schlesinger, who worked out in detail a number of variants on the general theme of limited nuclear war.

The proclaimed political motive of Directive No. 59 was to enhance the capability of the US nuclear guarantees given to its West European allies but in actual fact the aim was to strengthen the internal cohesion of NATO and the leading role of the United States in it, to justify the continuation of the arms build-up, and last but not least to deceive the public in Western Europe. The Directive was also intended to create the impression that, in the event of a conflict, the United States would be seeking to conduct the war in a "humane" manner.

Directive No. 59 was a detailed instruction for the unleashing and fighting of nuclear war, both on a global and a regional scale. Its characteristic feature was that, compared to previous statements it provided for a much larger number of variants on the general plan of a limited nuclear war. This is also clear from the fact that the SIOP 5 D Plan, listing envisaged targets for nuclear strikes, detailed 40,000 targets, wheras the previous plan had only 25,000 targets for about 15,000 nuclear warheads. The Directive also stated that, for nuclear strikes against strategically-important targets, both strategic nuclear weapons and the medium-range weapons systems in Western Europe could be used. It envisaged nuclear wars, global and regional, both limited in time and protracted. The pre-emptive first strike was regarded in the Directive as the most suitable variant for starting a war.

The nuclear strategy of the Carter Administration also meant that stress was placed primarily on the qualitative aspects of the weapons systems in the build-up of the strategic nuclear potential of the United States. According to the views of the Pentagon, increased accuracy of ground-launched intercontinental ballistic missiles and missiles launched from nuclear-powered submarines was to make possible a counterforce concept, which in fact meant the ability to launch a pre-emptive nuclear first strike. Pentagon strategists pointed out that insufficient accuracy of the older types of intercontinental ballistic missiles made it impossible to hit small targets, and therefore nuclear strikes had to be planned against cities, as they were big targets to hit. The "humaneness" of the new nuclear strategy rested they claimed in the fact that nuclear attacks would in future be planned against military installations such as strategic

missile bases of the enemy, command posts and government buildings.

But of course the real purpose was not to make war more "humane" but to paralyse within several minutes the central political and military structures of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and to reduce or completely prevent their ability to respond with a retaliatory strike. Moreover the US nuclear strategy did not rule out nuclear strikes against cities. The Directive provided for sufficient reserves of strategic nuclear weapons which would not be used for the first strike but would be launched in the next phase of a nuclear war.

However, the existing offensive weapons of the United States were not so effective as to be able to prevent a retaliatory Soviet nuclear strike against the territory of the United States. Therefore the Pentagon was looking for a solution and decided to use, for the proposed nuclear first strike, qualitatively new weapons systems—the Pershing 2 and cruise missiles now deployed in Western Europe. Pentagon strategists also plan to deploy these medium-range systems in other parts of the world adjacent to the borders of the Soviet Union, so that their short flying time to the target sould make it impossible for the Soviet Union to be warned in time of the start of such an attack and thus be unable to carry out retaliatory measures, including a retaliatory nuclear strike against targets in the United States. This is the main purpose of the nuclear strategy of the United States, both in a global nuclear conflict or a "limited" nuclear war. This applies to the nuclear strategies of both the Carter Administration and the present government of Ronald Reagan.

In connection with the plans to launch and fight a limited nuclear war in Europe, American propaganda is trying to convince the West European public that such a war could be fought according to some unwritten rules and principles. Such views are not only unrealistic, they are deliberate lies.

No sensible person would consider it possible to compare nuclear war to a game of chess in which the side under attack will respond only with the same degree of nuclear weapon as that used by the aggressor. Such rules cannot exist in a nuclear war. War has never been and is not a game. The purpose of every war is to defeat the adversary. It can therefore be safely assumed that, in the event of another war, both sides would be resolutely fighting it,

using all their forces and weapons including, should the United States use them first, various types of nuclear weapons. Nuclear war would result in the annihilation of the whole of mankind. However, influential political circles in the United States, and the Pentagon strategists, are evidently still convinced that under certain conditions, it would be possible to win a nuclear war. This belief is made clear by the dangerous policy of the Reagan Adminstration.

THE PATH TO PEACE AND SECURITY

An objective analysis of the foreign and military policy of the United States makes it clear that it is the US which is instigating the arms build-up in the world. It was the United States and not the Soviet Union which initiated the deployment of medium-range missiles in Europe. The Soviet Union has always done only what it has been necessary to do for its own security and the security of its allies, and always after the next arms escalation step had been taken by the United States and NATO.

The Soviet Union has always regarded it as more sensible to deal with the issues of war and peace through constructive negotiations, guided by the principles of equality and equal security of both sides, and not by the stockpiling of new and increasingly dangerous weapons.

Ever since nuclear weapons appeared on the world scene, the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries set themselves the foreign policy goal of averting the danger of atomic war as their priority and seeing the best way of achieving this in the elimination of nuclear weapons. At the start of the atomic era, in 1946, the Soviet Union put forward in the United Nations a proposal for the banning of the production and use of nuclear weapons. According to this proposal, the use of atomic weapons would have been prohibited under all circumstances, their production and stockpiling would have been banned, and the existing stockpiles would have been destroyed within three months after the agreement was to have come into effect. But the US Government did not want to lose its nuclear monopoly, and called for a so-called "internationalisation" of all atomic production under the control of Washington. In the 1950s the Soviet Union put forward a number of disarmament proposals concerning nuclear weapons. In September 1959, at the 14th Session of the UN General Assembly, it submitted a draft declaration on general and complete disarmament, the main article of which provided for the elimination

of all atomic and hydrogen bombs, and military missiles of all kinds. At the same time the Soviet Union proposed that nuclear energy be used solely for peaceful purposes.

During the Soviet-US SALT 1 and SALT 2 talks, the Soviet Union also asked that the question of US forward-based nuclear weapons, whose installation forced the USSR to deploy similar weapons systems, be resolved. On November 23, 1979, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko said at a press conference in Bonn that in connection with the preparatory work on the SALT 2 treaty, the Soviet Union also wanted the question of the US forward-based nuclear weapons to be considered. But this was categorically rejected by the Americans.

Later, when an extensive campaign was launched in the West around an alleged Soviet superiority in medium-range missiles, with the aim of justifying the dual decision agreement by NATO, the Soviet Union again proposed talks on this problem. At a press conference in Moscow on July 25, 1979, Andrei Gromyko told journalists that success at the forthcoming negotiations on a third strategic arms limitation treaty would only be possible if all the factors of the strategic situation in the world, including Europe, were taken into consideration. This meant that success required that the question of the US forward-based nuclear weapons was on the agenda of the talks. The senior Soviet representative, Leonid I Brezhnev, said, in an interview with a *Pravda* correspondent on November 8, 1979, that there was only one way of finding a solution to the question of these weapons—to start negotiations. The Soviet Union was aware that it was necessary to start the talks without any delay, and was ready to do so. Everything depended on the Western countries.

All the declarations, calls and proposals of Soviet representatives have shown that the Soviet Union and its allies sincerely wish to find a speedy solution to the question of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe, either within the framework of a global solution to the problem of atomic weapons, or at separate negotiations.

But the responses of the United States was that towards the end of 1979 it began to delay ratification of the SALT 2 treaty and thus also the beginning of SALT 3 talks. The Soviet Union was aware of the pressing need to solve the problem of medium-range missiles, and therefore—as Andrei Gromyko disclosed at his Bonn press conference, mentioned earlier—proposed that talks were started on

medium-range missiles immediately without waiting for the SALT 3 negotiations.

This convincingly shows that the dual decision agreement of NATO was not needed to make the Soviet Union come to the negotiating table to discuss the question of medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe. The Soviet Union itself insisted that such talks be held, put forward concrete proposals for them and only the persistent refusals of the United States made it impossible to achieve positive results with regard to this issue.

DUAL DECISION

Despite all the efforts of the Soviet Union, the NATO Council approved on December 12, 1979, the plan for phased deployment of the new US medium-range missiles in Western Europe, designated as a "dual decision". The first part of the plan was the decision to build and deploy 572 launching installations for US medium-range missiles in five West European countries, beginning in 1983. The second part of the decision contained NATO's conditions, tantamount to an ultimatum, on the basis of which the United States wanted, with the support of its West European allies, to pursue its interests from a position of strength during the talks with the Soviet Union on the limitation of medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe. The dual decision used in this way was intended to weaken the opposition of those who rightly saw in the new nuclear weapons an increased danger of a nuclear catastrophe, a mortal danger for Europe.

By this time a number of West European politicians had realised that the deployment of 108 launching installations for Pershing 2 ballistic missiles and 464 Tomahawk cruise missiles would have very serious consequences for peace and security in Europe. To a certain degree the danger of these US missiles can be estimated from their combat properties. The Pershing 2 mibile ballistic missiles have a range of about 2,500 km and great accuracy, they are capable of impacting within 35-40 metres from the centre of the target. The main factor is their ability to hit, within 5-6 minutes of launching from West German territory, Soviet strategic installations in the western regions of the USSR. The deployment of these missiles has thus substantially changed the strategic situation not only in Europe but also on the global scale.

A similar aim was pursued in the US plan to deploy cruise missiles (106 in Britain, 96 in West Germany, 112 in Italy, and 48 each in Belgium and the Netherlands). Their

range is also about 2,500 km, and they carry a 200-kiloton nuclear warhead, which has an explosive force 15 times greater than that of the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima. Cruise missiles have an almost pinpoint accuracy. During its flight, a cruise missile follows the terrain at a height of only 50 to 60 metres and is programmed to change its course both vertically and horizontally, which lessens its chance of detection by air defence radar installations.

Immediately after the dual decision was taken, the Western press began to vehemently claim that the document was offering negotiations with the Soviet Union —honest, serious, effective, without preliminary conditions —and that it was up to the Soviet Union which option it would choose: talks or armament. This presentation, at first sight logical, was intended to deceive European public opinion and make the Soviet Union the warmonger. In actual fact the offer made to the Soviet Union by the United States and its NATO allies was neither honest nor without preliminary conditions. The dual decision envisaged talks only on the Soviet medium-range missiles and the US Pershing 2 and cruise missiles.

Excluded in advance from the proposed negotiations were all forward-based medium-range weapons systems of the United States, ie. all those weapons which prompted the Soviet Union to deploy its medium-range missiles in the first place.

Similarly another point of the dual decision envisaged that all agreed limitations on ground-based medium-range nuclear missile systems had to accord with the principle of equality of the two sides. The restrictions had to have the form of equality both as regards their limits and the rights of the two sides.

By demanding in advance equality in limits only for medium-range missiles, the dual decision in fact asked for the United States' legal affirmation of its right to alter the general balance of forces in its favour.

To agree to this preliminary condition would have meant that the Soviet Union would be obliged to reduce the number of its medium-range missiles, while the US forward-based weapons would not be reduced. Moreover, neither the French nor British medium-range nuclear missiles were to be taken into account at the talks.

These two demands proved that the dual decision did not offer negotiations without preliminary conditions.

They also proved that the Western conditions would make the proposed negotiations into a means of legalising and strengthening their military superiority.

The problem of medium-range missiles was so serious that in this situation the Soviet Union did not abandon its efforts to achieve mutually-acceptable initial position, based on the principles of equality and equal security. The refusal of the United States and NATO to adopt a more constructive stance caused concern not only among the public but also among numerous government officials in Western Europe. For example, Helmut Schmidt, during his visit to Moscow in the summer of 1980, publicly recognised the justification of the Soviet demand that the forward-based US nuclear weapons be on the agenda of the negotiations.

But US and NATO representatives were persistently refusing constructive talks with the Soviet Union, claiming that the situation would change after the deployment of the new US missiles, and that they would be ready to take part in talks then. The situation becamse even more complicated after President Ronald Reagan took office. The new US Administration not only began to reject even more resolutely all peace initiatives of the Soviet Union, but declared as its main task the intensification of the arms build-up, especially in the nuclear sphere. US Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinbereger, said openly in the *New York Times,* August 14, 1981, that within ten years, the United States would gain nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union.

"DIRECT CONFRONTATION"

The concrete steps taken by the Reagan Administration in the sphere of the foreign and military policy of the United States show that in certain cases the principles of Carter's policy were only carried forward in greater detail or extended, but that in many other cases the Administration adopted its own principles of a new type of US espansionism and demonstrations of US resolve to make military interventions in all parts of the world. This is evident in the five main areas of the US military efforts which constitute the military-strategic principles of the Reagan doctrine, also call the doctrine of direct confrontation. They are:

1. Modification of the US nuclear strategy.
2. Intensification of preparations for war in outer space.
3. The creation of conditions for decisive operations fought by coventional weapons in the ground, in the air and on the seas.
4. Improved capacity for military interventions anywhere in the world.
5. Intensification of "special", ie. subversive operations.

The threats to use force and the use of armed forces, including the strategic offensive forces, are regarded in the doctrine as the most important and, according to the given situation, as the only means of achieving foreign policy objectives of the United States.

According to Caspar Weinberger, the new doctrine is to give the United States complete and incontestable military superiority, to restore its leading role in the world and to ensure active opposition to the Soviet Union in all parts of the world.

In the sphere of nuclear strategy, the direct confrontation doctrine is based on Carter's Directive No. 59 but makes it more precise, and as regards a limited nuclear war, counts on it—in keeping with overall worldwide US policy—not only in Europe but also in other regions of the world.

The fundamental principle of a nuclear war remains as

during the Carter presidency—the pre-emptive nuclear first strike. Its mechanism was described by Caspar Weinberger on July 17, 1981, in his notorious address to the Institute of International Relations, in New York.

Weinberger said that nuclear war must be fought in such a way that after the exchanges of nuclear strikes in all stages of the conflict the United States would be left with a sufficient number of nuclear weapons which would ensure its superiority. According to the Pentagon's concept, the pre-emptive first strike would be dealt by the Pershing 2 missiles wich would destroy the main command of the Warsaw Treaty armies, some of the Soviet intercontinental missiles—for this purpose, a special warhead has been developed—as well as airfields with strategic bombers. Cruise missiles would attack among other targets, Soviet military ports in which some of the nuclear-powered submarines equipped with ballistic missiles are always at anchor in peacetime, and some other strategically-important targets.

These pre-emptive strikes by nuclear medium-range missiles would be directed against Soviet territory simultaneously from several directions, in order to put out of action the largest possible part of Soviet strategic potential.

The Pentagon calculates that after the first pre-emptive strike, the Soviet Union would be left with a limited number of strategic weapons, ie. primarily the submarines which would be operating in oceans and seas at the time of the attack on the Soviet Union.

In view of the fact that most of the Soviet strategic weapons are ground-based, Pentagon strategists believe that after the loss of the greater part of the land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, strategic bombers and some of the submarines carrying ballistic missiles, the Soviet government would not dare to order the remaining missiles to be launched against targets in the United States, the reason being that in this phase of a war, the entire US offensive strategic potential would be intact and its use against targets in the Soviet Union would mean its total destruction. This would give victory to the United States without nuclear retaliatory strikes against its own territory.

The United States assumes that a third world war would be fought in Europe, just as the first and second. It is ready to sacrifice its allies in order to reduce the danger of its own destruction.

After the Reagan Administration took office, what the

Soviet Union and some Western politicians had long been expecting actually happened. The United States is now doing everything to reduce the dual decision only to that part concerning the deployment of US medium-range missiles in Western Europe, whereas the negotiating part will be used only to calm the public who will ultimately face an accomplished fact as regards the deployment of US missiles. When these warnings were first voiced, they were branded as pure propaganda, without any real foundation, but subsequent events have shown clearly that they were correct.

Almost seven years have passed since the dual decision was adopted. In bases in Western Europe, US missiles are now operational in readiness for a first strike, but Western propaganda—just like seven years ago—is calming the West European public by assurances that the West is acting with all seriousness at the disarmament talks in Geneva, that there are no grounds for concern and that it is simply necessary to await the outcome of the talks.

The conduct of the United States and its position at the Soviet-US talks on medium-range missiles proves that Washington needed the dual decision only in order to obtain the consent of its West European NATO allies to the deployment of the new missiles on their soil, missiles which are to carry out strategic tasks as part of the pre-emptive nuclear first strike.

The United States also needed the dual decision as a means of exerting pressure on the Soviet Union, which was to be forced to agree to such treaty conditions which would place it in an unequal position and which would not only ensure but also legalise the military-strategic superiority of the United States.

THE SOVIET-US TALKS IN GENEVA

The overwhelming part of the West European public realised clearly that the US government was not in the least interested in lessening tension in the world. It also realised that West European representatives were not exerting sufficient pressure on the US government to begin negotiations with the Soviet Union. That is why, in the summer of 1981, peace movements in Western Europe started a new phase of the struggle against the US missiles. A wave of strong opposition engulfed all Europe.

Because of the principled Soviet stand, and the increasing pressure of world public opinion and some representatives in West European countries, the United States was ultimately forced to begin talks with the Soviet delegation in Geneva. In October and November 1980, the two sides discussed questions connected with the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe.

The talks proper opened in Geneva on November 30, 1981. After long obstructive delays, the United States was compelled to sit down at the negotiating table because it wished to weaken the resolve of the West European public to prevent the deployment of the US missiles at all costs. Also, this step was intended to settle at least partly the deep differences between the United States and Western Europe. Washington's NATO allies had to support its policy in other parts of the world.

Western propaganda used the start of the talks to point out the effectiveness of the dual decision as a means of pressurising the Soviet Union. It claimed that it was the dual decision which compelled the Soviet Union to withdraw its previous objections against beginning talks on medium-range missiles in Europe. It also claimed that the Soviet Union made the concession at the talks of Soviet and West German representatives in Moscow on June 30-July 1, 1980.

However, this was not the case. Firstly, as we have

already shown, the Soviet Union has never been opposed to talks on medium-range missiles but, on the contrary, wanted them to be started sooner, and proposed various forms according to the existing situation. The outcome of the talks in Moscow as regards this issue was not due to the effect of the dual decision on the Soviet Union but rather to its principled stand. Western propaganda also tried to convince public opinion that, as a consequence of the talks with West German officials, the Soviet Union had changed its position with regard to the dual decision, and was ready to accept unequal conditions as the basis of the negotiations.

The real position of the Soviet Union was explained in a document of the CPSU Central Committee Politbureau, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Council of Ministers, published on July 5, 1980, and devoted to the outcome of the talks between Soviet and West German representatives. It said that the Soviet side affirmed its previous views on the best ways of solving the question of medium-range weapons in Europe and, guided by the need for peace and security, proposed that the question of medium-range nuclear missiles be discussed simultaneously in connection with the question of US forward-based nuclear weapons. It was necessary to assume that eventual agreements on these questions might be implemented after the Soviet-US strategic arms limitation treaty (SALT 2) had come into effect.

The purpose of this Soviet step was to persuad the West to finally agree to begin talks on really equal terms, and to give them the opportunity to get out of the blind alley into which they had manoeuvred themselves by their dual decision. An important aspect of the document was that the Soviet initiative provided for a flexible connection between the strategic arms limitation process and a solution to the problem of medium-range missiles in Europe. In the wake of the delays connected with endorsement of the SALT 2 treaty, for which the Soviet Union was not responsible, the Soviet government, in order to speed up the start of talks on medium-range weapons, did not link these talks to the start of any SALT 3 negotiations. On the basis of the close connection between the two weapons systems, the Soviet Union proposed that the agreement on medium-range missiles be implemented after the SALT 2 treaty had come into effect.

Before the start of the Soviet-US negotiations, the USSR

launched a large-scale peace initiative whose purpose was to create a more favourable climate for the talks. It proposed that before the talks, a moratorium be declared on the deployment of new medium-range missiles by NATO and the USSR in Europe, ie. that the then level of these weapons be quantitatively and qualitatively frozen, including of course the forward-based US nuclear weapons in the region.

The United States put forward its own proposal amidst great publicity: on November 18, 1981, President Reagan outlined his "zero option".

What did the US President propose? He suggested that the Soviet Union should scrap all its medium-range missiles in Europe (the SS 4, SS 5 and SS 20 missiles), as a condition for the non-deployment of the new US missiles, while the US' medium-range nuclear potential on forward bases in Europe, and the nuclear weapons of Britain and France would remain unaffected. What magnanimity! Ronald Reagan did not say, understandably, that six weeks before, on October 2, 1981, he had adopted the most extensive programme of nuclear armament in the history of the United States. Nor did he point out that while the Soviet Union would be deprived of all its medium-range missiles in Europe, the West would retain—according to the "zero option"—723 US nuclear-capable planes with a range in excess of 1,000 km, 64 Polaris missiles, 55 strategic bombers of the British RAF and 144 French strategic nuclear carriers. The balance of forces which would be created by this "zero option", or rather uniltarel disarmament of the Soviet Union, would give the United States 50 per cent superiority in the number of carriers and 100 per cent superiority in warheads.

It was clear that Reagan's "zero option" was only a major propaganda attempt to decieve the public, weaken the massive opposition to the US' militarist course and to blame the Soviet Union, if it refused to accept this US ultimatum—for the failure of the Geneva talks.

The Soviet Union adopted entirely different positions for the negotiations: it proposed the complete elimination of both medium-range missiles and planes in Europe, to be followed by the complete elimination of tactical nuclear weapons.

To prove its goodwill, the Soviet Union, in May 1982, announced its unilateral moratorium on the deployment of medium-range nuclear missiles in the European part of the

USSR. The replacement of the obsolete SS 4 and SS 5 missiles by the new SS 20s was suspended and the construction of launching installations for these missiles was halted. The Soviet Union also announced, in 1982, its readiness to substantially and unilaterally reduce the number of its medium-range missiles.

The US President rejected the Soviet proposals as "not going sufficiently far".

In the course of the talks, which became deadlocked, there were no major shifts in the positions of the two sides. In December 1982, the Soviet Union proposed a new solution: it would retain in Europe only the same number of missiles as Britain and France. This meant that the Soviet Union was ready to reduce its nuclear potential by hundreds of missiles, including scores of SS 20s. For the USSR and the United States it would be a really honest "zero option" for medium-range missiles. And, if the number of British and French missiles were reduced in the future, the number of Soviet missiles would be reduced accordingly.

The Soviet Union also proposed an agreement be concluded on the reduction of the number of aircraft that could carry medium-range weapons and which were deployed in Europe by the Soviet Union and NATO to be the same level on both sides.

Not even this far-reaching Soviet proposal was accepted by the United States which continued its intensive preparations for the deployment of Pershing 2 and cruise missiles, As planned, phased deployment of these medium-range missiles was started in Western Europe in 1983.

Since the United States thus made it impossible to reach a mutually-acceptable agreement at the Geneva talks, and their continuation was used only to cloak the actions of the US and other NATO countries aimed at undermining Europeand and international security, the Soviet Union found it impossible to continue the talks. In accordance with an agreement reached with its Warsaw Treaty allies, it then took the necesary steps to ensure that the East-West balance of forces was not upset by the deployment of US medium-range weapons in Western Europe. At the same time however, the Soviet Union stressed—not for the first time—that no possibility and no chance must be missed for a return to negotiations on the reduction of nuclear weapons in the East and in the West, on the only realistic basis which exists—the principle of equality and equal security.

The principled Soviet approach to the matter of war and peace was followed in the subsequent period. Throughout 1984, the world was informed of a number of major constructive peace proposals from the USSR and the other Warsaw Treaty countries which were intended to improve the international climate by deepening mutual confidence between states, and by partial steps on the long and complex path to disarmament. The range of Soviet peace initiatives included a proposal for the freeze of the nuclear arsenals of the USSR and the USA, for measures designed to ban the militarisation of outer space, and to avert the danger of chemical war. In the political circles of many countries, the Soviet project for the codification of relations between the nuclear powers aroused special interest. Its provisions included the pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, and in the event of the threat of a nuclear conflict, the project envisaged emergency consultation to prevent it. The nuclear powers would refrain from propaganda in favour of nuclear war, from making nuclear weapons available to other countries, from deploying them in outer space, and they would seek their phased elimination.

The Western stance in that period could be described as tactical manoeuvering aimed at concealing the unwillingness of the West to reach concrete agreements on the basis of the principle of equality and equal security. In 1984, US politicians did raise the question of peace, and, together with representatives of West European countries, spoke of their desire for peace and disarmament. It is immaterial whether they were doing so because of election considerations, the pressure of public opinion, the strength of the peace movement, or attempts to put the socialist countries onto the defensive. Whatever the reasons were, the change in the tone of official statements found no reflection in the military policy of the United States, was not accompanied by any diminishing in the intensity of the war preparations of the NATO pact, and was not evident in any progress at any of the ongoing disarmament negotiations. When the West put forward new proposals, it was only to suggest that they were willing to be flexible and ready to reach agreement. There was however a single positive result: after complicated Soviet-American talks, it was announced in the joint communique at the meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs on January 8, 1985, that the Soviet Union and the United States had agreed to begin

new talks on the entire range of questions concerning nuclear and space weapons. In view of the overall international situation, this was a step of extraordinary importance but of course its real significance will be determned by the concrete course and outcome of the talks.

FOR THE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY THE YEAR 2000

In view of the complexity of the problem, it is logical that the Soviet-US talks in Geneva are difficult. It must be borne in mind that the US arms programmes have been drawn up for a period up to the 1990s, thus guaranteeing massive profits for the military-industrial complex. It is this military -industrial complex, comprising US arms manufacturers, the Pentagon heirarchy, many leading politicians, industrialists and financiers, which exerts the decisive influence on the policy of the US government. It is therefore extremely difficult for more realistic politicians who would be capable of reversing the course of confrontation to exert any influence. Their efforts could thwart attempts to gain military superiority and prevent the United States from imposing its dictat from a position of strength,

For its part the Soviet Union did everything to achieve positive results at the Geneva talks. It proposed to the United States, for example, that in order to improve the climate of the negotiations the following measures should be adopted while the talks were in progress:

—halt development (including scientific research), tests and deployment of offensive weapons in space,

—freeze the strategic offensive weapons on both sides,

—halt the deployment of US medium-range missiles in Western Europe and the counter measures of the Soviet Union and its allies.

At the same time the Soviet Union decided to impose a temporary unilateral moratorium on the deployment of its medium-range missiles, and to suspend the implementation of further counter measures in Europe.

Unfortunately, the desirable turn in the negotiationa in Geneva has not yet been achieved. On of the reasons is the US' position with reagrd to the militarisation of outer space. Also, in the sphere of medium-range nuclear missiles, which are one of the three weapons systems on the agenda

in Geneva, a mutally-acceptable position has not yet been found. But, despite these difficulties, the Soviet Union continues to search for a solution. Especially important in this connection was the speech made by Mikhail Gorbachov in the French parliament on October 3, 1985. Gorbachov declared that the Soviet Union regards it as possible to conclude an agreement on medium-range nuclear weapons separately, without direct links with the issues of space and strategic weapons. He also explained the Soviet view regarding the nuclear arsenals of France and Britain.

Mikhail Gorbachov stressed that French and British nuclear weapons were growing fast and that the Soviet Union could no longer close its eyes to the fact. He pointed out that the French side takes the view that its nuclear force cannot be discussed without the participation of France. It follows from this, Mikhail Gorbachov went on, "that it is time to begin a direct dialogue on this subject, and to try to find an acceptable solution through joint efforts. The Soviet Union is ready to start such direct talks with France, just as with Great Britain". But the French and British governments rejected Mikhail Gorbachov's proposal and direct talks on medium-range weapons.

In his speech in the French parliament, Mikhail Gorbachov said that after the annoucement of the unilateral moratorium, the Soviet Union had 243 SS 20 missiles operational in the European zone. The old SS 5 missiles had already been completely removed and the dismantling of the SS 4s was continuing. The total number of medium-range nuclear missiles in the European part of the Soviet Union was substantially lower than 10-15 years before.

The Soviet Union thus made another important step towards disarmament in 1985. The concrete Soviet disarmament measures and peace proposals represented a range of constructive and realistic measures whose implementation (with parallel US actions to these unilateral Soviet steps) would undoubtedly lead to an improvement in international relations to the benefit of peace, security and co-operation among nations.

A radical proposal for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons from the face of the Earth was made by Mikhail Gorbachov on January 15, 1986. The realistic character of the Soviet plan rests, amongst other things, on the fact that in view of the complexity of the problem, it envisages phased elimination of nuclear weapons by the end of the century. It is clear that the problem of nuclear

weapons cannot be solved overnight. Therefore, the Soviet Union proposed to proceed from relatively less complex problems to more difficult issues, to increase gradually the number of countries taking part in the efforts to solve them, to gain experience from concrete disarmament steps in one sphere and apply them to others. The proposed phases for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons were formulated accordingly.

For the first stage of five to eight years, the Soviet proposal envisages that the number of Soviet and US nuclear missiles capable of hitting the territory of the other side be reduced by half. Such radical cuts would only be possible if the two sides agreed to renounce production, tests and deployment of offensive space weapons. The first-stage proposal also envisages the elimination of the Soviet and US medium-range missiles in Europe, the US to pledge not to supply these weapon systems to other countries, and the obligation of Britain and France not to increase their nuclear armaments. It should be noted that the Soviet Union has never supplied nuclear weapons to any other country and is on record as resolving never to do so in the future.

In the second stage, to begin in 1990 at the least, and to last five to seven years, other countries would join this disarmament process. A worldwide test ban would come into effect together with a ban on the production of non-nuclear weapons based on new physical and scientific principles whose destructive power comes close to that of mass annihilation weapons. In the second stage, the other types of guided missiles with nuclear warheads would be eliminated.

All remaining types of nuclear weapons would be eliminated in the third stage, and the process would be completed by the year 2000.

At the Soviet-US talks in Geneva, the USSR detailed its proposals and, in the sphere of medium-range weapons, met the United States and NATO countries halfway by agreeing that the efforts to solve this problem be no longer tied to the problems of strategic weapons and the militarisation of outer space. Also, the Soviet Union excluded the nuclear forces of Britain and France from the consideration of the European nuclear balance, and responded to the concern of the West European public about extended-range guided missiles, which had been deployed in several Warsaw Treaty countries in response to the new US medium-range missiles

in Western Europe. These were now withdrawn back to the USSR,

The Soviet Union proposed that the Soviet and US medium-range missiles be completely removed from the European zone, on the basis of reciprocity—both ballistic and cruise missiles. The only Soviet demand was that Britain and France refrain from increasing the number of their weapons systems. All questions connected with this could be the subject of direct exchanges of views with these countries. The United States would have to pledge not to supply its strategic missiles and medium-range guided missiles to other countries.

Lying on the table in Geneva is a document which spells out the obligations of the two sides in the event of the complete removal of Soviet and US medium-range missiles from Europe, and the removal of Soviet extended-range guided missiles from this region.

The socialist countries are, of course, aware that the elimination of nuclear weapons would not rid mankind of its fear of the horrors of war. Therefore they put forward a whole series of other disarmament measures including the creation of nuclear-free zones, zones free of chemical weapons, and a substantial reduction of the conventional potential of the two sides.

The Warsaw Treaty countries outlined their principled position as regards nuclear-free zones in their call address to European countries, the United States and Canada, delivered to their governments through the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry in the spring of 1986. In their appeal, the Warsaw Treaty countries expressed their full support for the idea of the creation of nuclear-free zones in Europe, and voiced their readiness to help translate it into reality.

The call stressed that the creation of nuclear-free zones in Europe was more pressing today than at any time before. In Europe, more than anywhere else, the concentration of armed forces and armaments had reached dangerous dimensions. The level of nuclear confrontation is high and the risk of an accidental nuclear war great. The call said that the countries of the Warsaw Treaty alliance were convinced that the creation of nuclear-free zones in Europe would help strengthen the security of the countries in these zones, as well as European and world security, stability and mutual confidence; it would advance the process of detente, facilitate reductions of armed forces and armaments, strengthen the nuclear arms non-proliferation

accord and make possible a broader use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The creation of nuclear-free zones is closely connected with development of good neighbourly relations, mutual understanding and co-operation.

An equally strong emphasis is placed by the socialist states on the creation of a zone without chemical weapons in central Europe. In 1984, representatives of two political parties—the Socialist Unity Party (SED) of the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD) of the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany)—worked out a framework agreement on the creation of a zone without chemical weapons in Europe. Later, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia joined the agreement. which envisages that the states ready to become parties in the proposed zone without toxic substances would undertake to remove chemical weapons from their soil and not to permit their future stockpiling, not to produce and obtain such weapons, and not to permit other states to produce or deploy them on their territory.

Even though the proposed agreement does not fully solve the problem of chemical weapons, it is evident that even this partial regional solution would help strengthen confidence in Europe and reduce the danger of war. The Czechoslovak and GDR governments submitted the proposals to West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, but the Bonn government took a negative stand on the creation of such a zone; thus it supported the planned modernisation of US binary chemical weapons destined for Europe.

An extremely important call was made in July 1986 in Budapest, at a session of the Warsaw Treaty Political Advisory Committee. The call, addressed to the NATO states and all the other European countries, represents in fact a far-reaching programme of reductions of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe. The Warsaw Treaty states proposed substantial cuts of all ground forces and tactical offensive air forces of European states, and corresponding forces and weapons of the United States and Canada stationed in Europe. The proposed reduction would also apply to nuclear weapons of operational-tactical designation, with a range of up to 1,000 km, in addition to conventional armament. The geographical area of the reduction would be the whole of Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals.

The Warsaw Treaty countries proposed that the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in

Europe be carried out in stages, with constant preservation of the military balance on successively lower levels, without imparing the security of either side. The cuts in troop levels of contingents and formations would also apply to their armaments, including nuclear weapons. According to the proposal of the Warsaw Treaty countries, which far exceeds the scope of the Vienna talks on reduction of armed forces and armaments in central Europe, the armed forces of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty would be reduced by 25 per cent by the beginning of the 1990s. The proposal refers to the constantly repeated affirmations of the West that say that the socialist countries are mainly interested in retaining superiority in conventional weapons.

These disarmament proposals of the Soviet Union and the other socialist states constitute the military-political content of the historic project of a comprehensive system of international security, outlined by Mikhail Gorbachov at the 27th Congress of the CPSU. Even though the project comprises an extensive series of measures in the military, political, economic and humanitarian spheres, it is logical that for its implementation, it is above all necessary to create an atmosphere of confidence among states, to halt the arms race and to reduce the danger of war to the minimum. Understandably, the socialist countries regard it as imperative to speedily adopt concrete, fundamental and mutually-verifiable disarmament measures which would help to gain a constant place in international relations for the policy of peaceful co-existence.

The United States and its NATO allies are, apparently, resolved to steer another course. The White House has already announced its renunciation of the SALT 2 Treaty and has indicated that the same fate will befall the Soviet-US Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty which Wahsington regards as an obstacle to its dangerous plans for the militarisation of outer space. Also the West European NATO countries are intensively carrying out their arms build-up programmes which go far beyond their legitimate defence needs. In this way, an increasingly dangerous situation is developing in Europe from which it will be extremely difficuly to find a way out.

In this connection, it is above all necessary to point out, as confirmed in many statemens of the highest representatives of the Warsaw Treaty states, that West European countries are not threatened in any way by the socialist countries. This was stressed most recently by Mikhail

Gorbachov, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, in his speech at the 11th Congress of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) in April 1986. He said: "We are being told that Western Europe cannot give up its nuclear weapons, including the American ones, because it would feel less secure against the armed forces and conventional weapons of the Warsaw Treaty countries. The right-wing press is trying to support this false argument and is frightening people by fantastic descriptions of an invasion of the West by Soviet tank armies.

"What do we regard as necessary to say in this connection?

"Above all that the elimination of nuclear weapons in Europe would create a new situation not only for the West but also for us. We cannot forget that in the pre-nuclear era, there were invasions of our territory from the West on several occasions.

"And another thing, from the capital of the socialist German Democratic Republic I would like to urge all people in Western Europe: Do not believe the allegations about the aggressiveness of the Soviet Union. Our country will never, in no circumstances, start armed operations against Western Europe, unless we and our allies become targets of a NATO attack. I repeat—never."

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